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Can We Boost Preschoolers’ Inhibitory Performance Just by Changing the
Way They Respond?




Changing the way children make their response appears to sometimes, but not always, boost their inhibitory
control—though interpreting existing findings is hampered by inconsistent methods and results. This study
investigated the effects of delaying, and changing, the means of responding. Ninety-six preschoolers (Mage
46 months) completed tasks assessing inhibitory control, counterfactual reasoning, strategic reasoning, and
false belief understanding. Children responded either immediately or after a delay, and either by pointing
with their finger, or with a hand-held arrow. Delaying boosted performance on all tasks except false belief
understanding; arrow-pointing only improved strategic reasoning. It is suggested that delay helps children
work out the correct response; it is unlikely to help on tasks where this requirement is absent.
Inhibitory control is the ability to overcome
prepotent but task-inappropriate responses. Over-
coming these responses is central to the ability to
act freely on the world, and inhibitory control is
vital to many aspects of development, including
mental-state reasoning (Carlson & Moses, 2001),
counterfactual thinking (Beck, Riggs, & Gorniak,
2009), academic performance (Gilmore et al., 2013),
and resisting temptation (Murray & Kochanska,
2002). The ability to overcome these responses
improves rapidly during the preschool period
(Petersen, Hoyniak, McQuillan, Bates, & Staples,
2016), partly through improvements in inhibitory
control itself (Gerstadt, Hong, & Diamond, 1994),
but also via other routes, such as better regulation
of the speed of responding, and cognitive distanc-
ing (Lee & Atance, 2016). Understanding the nature
of these alternative routes is essential, both for
understanding how inhibitory control develops and
as a basis for developing interventions to help chil-
dren who have difficulty with self-regulation.
Because inhibitory control is required in so many
domains, there is widespread interest in finding
ways in which young children—whose inhibitory
control is poor—can be helped to overcome incor-
rect prepotent responses. Indeed, an intriguing
(though fragmentary) literature offers promising
findings suggesting that it is possible to boost the
ability to overcome an incorrect prepotent response
using simple interventions. There are two distinct
manipulations that appear to help children. Both
focus on the way in which children make their
response.
The first such manipulation is to delay children’s
responding. Because the speed at which preschool-
ers respond is highly variable (Eckert & Eichorn,
1977), delay manipulations have tended simply to
add an extra step to the standard task response—
for example, by singing a song (e.g., Ling, Wong, &
Diamond, 2016), or waiting for an unrelated event
to finish (e.g., Beck, Carroll, Brunsdon, & Gryg,
2011). The rationale for this approach is that delay-
ing responding reduces a task’s inhibitory demands
by providing additional time—either for the correct
response to be worked out (the Active Computation
account: Diamond, Kirkham, & Amso, 2002), or for
the activation of the incorrect response to fade (the
Passive Dissipation account: Simpson & Riggs,
2007).
The second manipulation changes the way chil-
dren make their response, typically replacing a
finger-pointing gesture with an unfamiliar action—
for example, pointing with an arrow (Beck et al.,
2011), or placing a hoop over an object (e.g., Simp-
son & Riggs, 2007). The broad explanation behind
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this approach is that unfamiliar means of responding
create “cognitive distance,” a putative shift in per-
spective that allows children to view their own
actions as a subject for reflection (Hala & Russell,
2001), making unreflective, impulsive errors less
likely. We refer to these response-based improve-
ments as Response Delay effects and Response
Mode effects, respectively.
There is evidence to suggest that both kinds of
response manipulation can help children to over-
come incorrect prepotent responses. But surpris-
ingly, given the importance of the topic, the
available evidence is scant, and results are inconsis-
tent. Because methodologies vary greatly across
studies, it remains unclear whether inconsistencies
are due to the phenomena themselves being unreli-
able, or due simply to incidental task differences.
For example, introducing a delay improves chil-
dren’s performance on some inhibitory control mea-
sures, but not others. On the Day-Night task,
making children wait until the experimenter has
sung a song helps children inhibit the prepotent
response (Ling et al., 2016). But on Go/No-go tasks,
delaying responding by placing a screen between
the child and the array does not boost performance
(Barker & Munakata, 2015). Both tasks tap inhibi-
tory control, but adding delay leads to different
outcomes. Inhibitory control also plays an inciden-
tal but crucial role in many reasoning tasks (e.g.,
Beck et al., 2009; Carlson & Moses, 2001; Sabbagh,
Moses, & Shiverick, 2006). Delaying helps children
on some of these reasoning tasks, but not others.
Children’s counterfactual reasoning (e.g., answering
the question, “If the wind hadn’t blown, would the
picture be on the table, or in the tree?”) improved
when responding was delayed (Beck et al., 2011).
However, delay did not improve performance on
strategic reasoning tasks: when children had to
point to an empty box in order to win a box con-
taining a reward, they did just as badly after a
delay as when they responded immediately (Hala
& Russell, 2001). Both tasks require children to sup-
press a prepotent response; if delays help children
to overcome such a response, then we should
expect consistent improvement. Thus, results across
tasks are inconsistent and hard to interpret, leaving
open the question of whether the Response Delay
boost is a generalizable phenomenon, or a task-
specific artifact.
Similarly, inconsistent methodologies and find-
ings are seen with Response Mode manipulations.
Making children respond by pointing with an
arrow (rather than with their finger) helps over-
come prepotent responses on measures of
counterfactual reasoning (Beck et al., 2011), but not
mental-state reasoning (Carroll, Riggs, Apperly,
Graham, & Geoghegan, 2012). This divergence is
surprising: in both counterfactual tasks and theory
of mind tasks, children must think about an alter-
native world, suppressing any tendency to respond
based on reality. In contrast, many kinds of unfa-
miliar response modes help children on strategic
reasoning tasks. Simply pretending to point with an
arrow—while really pointing with their finger—
boosted performance to near-ceiling levels (Carroll,
FitzGibbon, & Critchley, 2014). So unfamiliar
response modes can provide a boost for preschool-
ers’ inhibitory control—but seemingly only in cer-
tain contexts.
If delaying, or changing, the way children
respond genuinely boosts inhibitory performance, it
could offer a way to support children in situations
where weak inhibitory control lets them down.
However, it is still unclear whether either manipu-
lation genuinely improves children’s performance,
or whether the disparate literature merely reflects
an ad hoc collection of task-specific findings. Previ-
ous methodologies have varied greatly between
studies. Many response manipulations have been
used, including pointing with a rotating arrow
(Carlson, Moses, & Hix, 1998), or handheld arrow
(Carroll et al., 2014); placing markers (Hala & Rus-
sell, 2001); putting hoops over objects (Simpson &
Riggs, 2007); or pressing buttons (Russell, Hala, &
Hill, 2003). The range of delay manipulations is
similarly wide, including singing the task rules
(Diamond et al., 2002); singing a nonsense ditty
(Ling et al., 2016); sitting in silence (Hala & Russell,
2001); watching dolls go down slides (Beck et al.,
2011); asking children to stop and think (Wimmer
& Perner, 1983); waiting for a screen to be removed
(Barker & Munakata, 2015); or giving oneself a tight
hug (Kusche & Greenberg, 1994). A systematic
approach to testing these phenomena is needed, to
identify whether these apparent effects are reliable.
To achieve that goal, this study tested the effects
of response delay and response mode on a single
sample of preschoolers, across four different cogni-
tive domains, each measure of which involved
overcoming an incorrect prepotent response. The
study used a 2 × 2 design to compare the effect of
manipulating Response Delay and Response Mode
on a classic measure of inhibitory control, and on
measures of strategic reasoning, counterfactual rea-
soning, and false belief understanding (where inhi-
bitory control is required incidentally to suppress a
task-inappropriate response). These tasks all require
children to respond by selecting one of two
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locations—either immediately or after a delay; and
either pointing with their finger or with an arrow
(see Table S1 for a summary of other task
demands). Children completed all four tasks,
responding in one of four ways: Finger-Delay,
Finger-No Delay, Arrow-Delay, and Arrow-No
Delay. In the two No Delay conditions, children
responded at their own pace; in the two Delay con-
ditions, preschoolers responded by tapping the
table three times, and then making their response.
This novel manipulation was chosen as it avoids
previous confounds by not providing rule remin-
ders (see Barker & Munakata, 2015), and because
pilot testing showed that children found this way
of responding easy. In the two Finger conditions,
children pointed with their finger; in the two Arrow
conditions, children responded using a hand-held




An a priori power analysis using G*Power (Faul,
Erdfelder, Lang, & Buchner, 2007) indicated that 88
participants were required to have 80% power for
detecting a medium-sized effect (0.25) for the two
main effects (Response Mode and Delay), with an
alpha value of .05. Ninety-six typically developing,
English-speaking children participated (Mage =
46 months, range = 39–54 months; 39 males). Of
these, 15 children failed to complete a full set of tri-
als for the Black-White task. Children were
recruited from preschools in medium-sized towns
in two lower-middle socioeconomic areas of the
United Kingdom. The group was predominantly
White (90%) and of mixed social class.
Design
A mixed 2 × 2 × 4 design was used, with
Response Mode (Finger vs. Arrow) and Response
Delay (Delay vs. No Delay) as between-child fac-
tors, and task (Black-White task, Windows task,
Counterfactual Reasoning task, False Belief task) as
a within-child factor. There were four conditions:
Finger-Delay, Finger-No Delay, Arrow-Delay, and
Arrow-No Delay (all conditions: N = 24). Children
were randomly allocated to a condition, and used
the same means of responding on all four tasks (see
Appendix S1, instructions). A one-way analysis of
variance (ANOVA) indicated that the conditions
did not differ in age, F(3, 92) = 11.20, p = .616
(Mage in months: Finger-Delay 46.2; Finger-No
Delay 45.2; Arrow-Delay 46.7; Arrow-No Delay,
45.7). Conditions were identical, apart from the
way in which children made their response.
Materials
For the Arrow conditions, a small arrow
mounted on a stick was used. For the Black-White
task, black and white laminated cards were used.
For the Windows task, four plastic boxes were used
(two opaque, two transparent); colorful stickers
were used as rewards. For the Counterfactual Rea-
soning task, four series of descriptive pictures were
used, showing the key events for each story, as well
as two possible answers. For the False Belief task,
four series of descriptive pictures were used, show-
ing the key events for each story, as well as two
possible answers.
Procedure
Tasks were administered over two sessions in a
counterbalanced order, constrained so that (a) the
Windows and Black-White tasks were in separate
sessions, and (b) the Counterfactual Reasoning and
False Belief tasks were in separate sessions (see
Table S2). Sessions lasted approximately 15 min,
and the two sessions were conducted on different
days. Children used the same mode of responding
for all four tasks, determined by their condition.
Black-White Task
This task was adapted from Simpson and Riggs
(2009). Children were shown a black card and a
white card, and were told to point to the black card
when the experimenter said “white,” and to point
to the white card when the experimenter said
“black.” There were four practice trials with feed-
back, followed by 12 test trials without feedback,
presented in a fixed pseudorandom order
(WBBWBWWBBWBW).
Windows Task
This task was adapted from Carroll et al. (2012).
For the training phase, children were shown two
opaque boxes, and watched the experimenter hide
a sticker in one of the boxes. Children were told
that they could choose which box the experimenter
looked in, and that if the experimenter found the
sticker, she would keep it; the child could then look
in the other box. Children were prompted with the
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words “Point to a box for me to look in.” This was
repeated for six training trials. As a check, after the
first box was opened on trial six, the child was
asked “So who gets the treat this time?” The train-
ing phase concluded when children gave three cor-
rect responses to this question (all children passed
the training phase).
For the testing phase, children completed 12 tri-
als following the same procedure, except that trans-
parent boxes were used. After each trial, the
experimenter announced in a neutral tone “[I/you]
keep the treat this time,” as appropriate. Children
used the same response mode in the training and
testing phases.
Counterfactual Reasoning Task
This task was adapted from Beck et al. (2011). There
were four test stories in total. In each story, an event
occurred that caused a protagonist to act in a particular
way. For example, in one story it starts to rain, so a
person in a park goes indoors to avoid the rain. The
child was then asked “What if it hadn’t rained—where
would [they] be?” Stories were accompanied by pic-
tures showing the events described. For each story,
children responded by pointing to one of two pictures:
one picture showed the current situation (e.g., the
character indoors), and one showed an alternative situ-
ation (e.g., the character in the park).
False Belief Task
This task was adapted from Carroll et al. (2012).
There were four test stories in total. In each story, a
protagonist initially held a true belief; then an event
occurred that caused that belief to become false
(e.g., an item was moved from one location to
another). The child was then asked where the pro-
tagonist thought the object was. For each trial, the
child was able to choose between two pictures to
indicate their response. One picture showed the
current situation (e.g., the object in its current loca-
tion), and one showed an alternative situation (e.g.,
the object in its original location).
Results
We hypothesized that there would be significant
effects of changing response mode, and of introduc-
ing a delay. For ease of comparison across tasks,
analyses were conducted on percentage accuracy
scores (accuracy by task and condition is shown in
Figure 1; note that arcsine transforming the data did
Figure 1. Accuracy (% correct) on task by condition, with standard error bars.
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not change the pattern of results). To investigate the
effects of Response Delay and Response Mode, a
2 × 2 × 4 mixed ANOVA was conducted, with
Response Delay (Delay, No Delay) and Response
Mode (Finger, Arrow) as between-child factors, and
Task (Black-White task, Windows task, Counterfac-
tual Reasoning task, False Belief task) as a within-
child factor. There was a significant main effect of
Response Delay, F(1, 77) = 10.46, p = .002, η2p = .12.
There was no main effect of Response Mode, F(1,
77) = 0.15, p = .697, η2p = .002, and no significant
interaction between Response Delay and Response
Mode, F(1, 77) = 0.33, p = .565, η2p = .004. There was
a significant main effect of Task, F(3, 231) = 73.47,
p < .001, η2p = .49. There were also significant inter-
actions between Task and Response Delay, F(3,
231) = 3.21, p = .024, η2p = .04, and between Task
and Response Mode, F(3, 231) = 3.50, p = .016,
η
2
p = .04. There was, however, no significant three-
way interaction between Task, Response Delay, and
Response Mode, F(3, 231) = 0.22, p = .88.
To follow up these interactions, four two-way
between-child analyses of variance were conducted,
one for each task, with Response Delay (Delay, No
Delay) and Response Mode (Finger, Arrow) as fac-
tors (see Table 1). In summary, introducing a delay
improved performance on three of the four tasks
(the Black-White, Windows, and Counterfactual
Reasoning tasks—but not the False Belief task).
Using a nonstandard response mode improved per-
formance on only one task (the Windows task).
There were no significant interactions between
Response Delay and Response Mode. Performance
on all tasks improved with age, though there were
no interactions between age and either response
manipulation (see Tables S3–S6).
Discussion
This study investigated whether children’s perfor-
mance on tasks involving inhibitory control can be
boosted by changing the way children make their
responses. It compared the effects of varying
Response Delay and Response Mode across four
cognitive domains, standardizing both the means of
delay and responding, and using a single sample of
children. Overall, a significant main effect was
observed for Response Delay, but not for Response
Mode. Separate task analyses revealed that
Response Delay improved performance on three
tasks (the Black-White, Windows, and Counterfac-
tual Reasoning tasks—but not the False Belief task).
This improvement was independent of whether
preschoolers responded using their finger or an
arrow. In contrast, a Response Mode boost was
seen only in the Windows task. These results clarify
our understanding of the way that changes in
response influence inhibitory performance: Delaying
responding can provide a generalizable benefit, but
changing the way children respond boosts perfor-
mance only in limited circumstances.
Response Delay Effects
The present findings replicate the Response
Delay effect previously observed with the Counter-
factual Reasoning task (Beck et al., 2011) and Day-
Night task (Montgomery & Fosco, 2012). Impor-
tantly, they go well beyond this, providing evi-
dence of a Response Delay effect in the Black-White
task and Windows task. It is now clear that genuine
benefits from a Response Delay are found on sev-
eral tasks—two pure measures of inhibitory control
(the Black-White and Day-Night tasks) and two dif-
ferent reasoning tasks with inhibitory demands (the
Windows and Counterfactual Reasoning tasks).
These data suggest that delaying responding can di-
rectly improve preschoolers’ performance on a
range of tasks requiring inhibitory control.
Table 1






F(1, 77) = 8.10,
p = .006, η2p = .095
No
F(1, 77) = 1.47,
p = .230, η2p = .019
Windows task Yesa
F(1, 92) = 4.91,
p = .029, η2p = .051
Yesa
F(1, 92) = 4.91,




F(1, 92) = 17.9,
p < .001, η2p = .163
No
F(1, 92) = 1.170,
p = .282, η2p = .013
False Belief task No
F(1, 92) = 0.548,
p = .461, η2p = .006
No
F(1, 92) = 0.367,
p = .546, η2p = .004
aIf Bonferroni corrections are made for the four follow-up analy-
ses of variance (alpha: p = .0125), then the Response Delay and
Response Mode effects on the Windows task become nonsignifi-
cant. However, we suggest that interpretation would misrepre-
sent children’s performance. The Windows task shows the
largest overall effect of response manipulation (p = .001,
η
2
p = .136), and since the Delay and Response Mode effects are of
similar size (both η2 = .051), we conclude that both should be
regarded as significant. We suggest that the lack of significance
in the post hoc comparisons is a type II error arising from a con-
servative Bonferroni correction, and that the appropriate inter-
pretation is that Windows task performance is improved both by
delay and alternative response modes.
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It would nevertheless be premature to conclude
that delay improves performance on all measures
of inhibitory control. In prior research, Go/No-go
task performance did not improve following a delay
(Barker & Munakata, 2015). This contrasting result
initially appears hard to explain, since the Go/No-
go task relies on inhibitory control—one might
therefore expect delays to improve performance.
However, the Active Computation account (Dia-
mond et al., 2002) offers a way to reconcile these
findings. It proposes that delay improves perfor-
mance by providing time for children to work out
the correct response. In the Black-White, Day-Night,
Windows and Counterfactual Reasoning tasks, chil-
dren need to work out the correct response—and
delay improves performance. Conversely, on the
Go/No-go task, there is no correct response to
work out (the task has a single response—no
response is made on inhibitory, No-go trials), and
delay does not improve performance. Thus, the
Active Computation account can explain why delay
improves performance on most inhibitory tasks, but
not the Go/No-go task. Conversely, the Passive
Dissipation account (Simpson & Riggs, 2007), which
posits that delay allows the activation of the incor-
rect prepotent response to fade, cannot explain why
delay fails to improve performance on the Go/No-
go task. The Go/No-go task does contain an incor-
rect prepotent response, and so according to the
Passive Dissipation account, delay should allow this
prepotency to fade, leading to better task perfor-
mance. The poor performance reported in Barker
and Munakata’s (2015) study shows clearly that this
was not the case.
Uniquely among the present tasks, there was no
Response Delay effect in the False Belief task. The
task clearly requires the child to work out the cor-
rect response, so it may seem surprising that addi-
tional time provided by a delay did not help. One
possible explanation is that preschoolers fail the
False Belief task because they do not yet have an
explicit understanding of false beliefs—that is, they
lack full conceptual understanding that other peo-
ple can have beliefs that are false, or different from
their own. There is evidence that infants have an
implicit understanding of mental states (Baillargeon,
Scott, & He, 2010), although interpretations of this
evidence differ (Heyes, 2014). What does seem clear
is that implicit knowledge of mental states develops
before the explicit understanding required to pass
the standard False Belief task. We suggest that
without this explicit understanding, it did not mat-
ter how long children were given on our False
Belief task. They were simply unable to work out
the correct response. (By extension, it is plausible
that delay could improve False Belief performance
in older children, who would like to have a slightly
better grasp of mental states than children in the
current sample.)
In contrast, counterfactual reasoning performance
was improved by a delay, consistent with the idea
that these children possess the conceptual knowl-
edge that changes to past events can lead to altered out-
comes, and that delays provide the time they need
to act on that knowledge. The crucial difference
between counterfactual reasoning and false belief
reasoning, we suggest, is presence versus absence
of explicit knowledge: children do understand that
changes to past events can lead to changes in the
present, but they don’t yet explicitly understand
that other people’s mental states can differ from
their own. If children lack explicit conceptual
knowledge, then a manipulation that helps them
to act on that knowledge will not improve
performance.
Response Mode Effects
Surprisingly, the Response Mode effect was lim-
ited, boosting performance only on a single task.
This study replicated the robust Response Mode
effect reported with the Windows task. However, it
did not replicate the Response Mode effect
observed with the Counterfactual Reasoning task
(Beck et al., 2011). In this study, children responded
using a handheld arrow; conversely, Beck et al.’s
study used a rotating arrow. As Beck and colleagues
noted, using a rotating arrow may also have intro-
duced a delay. If a Response Mode effect is only
seen when the nonstandard response slows
responding, but not when responding happens at
normal speed, this suggests that the improved per-
formance should be attributed to a Response Delay
effect. In other words, the apparent Response Mode
effect seen in the Counterfactual Reasoning task is
simply a Response Delay effect in disguise.
Thus, the benefits of changing response mode
seem to be limited—perhaps restricted only to the
Windows task. Notably, this beneficial effect is
apparent even with response modes that do not
delay responding. What is still unclear is why the
Windows task is particularly susceptible to the
Response Mode effect. One potential explanation
relates to children’s expectations about the act of
pointing itself. Several studies show that children
expect pointing to be veridical, and they have diffi-
culty interpreting pointing when it is used decep-
tively or incorrectly (Couillard & Woodward, 1999;
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Palmquist, Burns, & Jaswal, 2012). Children’s poor
performance on the standard Windows task may
reflect their expectations that pointing inherently
serves a veridical purpose (e.g., to point to the
desired treat). It may be that minor changes in the
pointing response remove these expectations. If so,
any deviation from standard veridical pointing
should free children from those expectations, allow-
ing them to act more freely.
Conclusion
The present results clarify how changes in the
way children respond can improve their inhibitory
control. Introducing a delay boosts performance,
with a plausible mechanism being that delays assist
children in working out the correct response—in
other words, an externally introduced delay can
free children from their own tendency to respond
too quickly, before they have worked out their
response. This raises the possibility that a crucial
part of the development of inhibitory control is
through children becoming better able to regulate
their own speed of responding (Atance, Bernstein,
& Meltzoff, 2010; Simpson et al., 2019). In contrast,
the benefits of changing response mode appear
more limited. Future interventions seeking to sup-
port children in overcoming prepotent responses
would have a greater likelihood of success if they
focus on delaying responses. The present data sug-
gest that doing so would boost performance on any
inhibitory task in which children must select
between different responses—though future work
should determine whether externally imposed
delays can also boost performance in other, nonin-
hibitory domains.
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